Comments on Maaike Rosendal's "A professor's case for killing"

The following are comments on part one of Maaike Rosendal's assessment of a debate in which she participated, back in April, at the University of Ottawa. It sounds like it might have been interesting. It would be interesting to hear how Matt would reply to Maaike's report of the debate and the arguments she presents. With due respect, it seems that Maaike needs to work on developing better reasoning skills and a better grasp of the issues. Here's my take (part one):

A professor’s case for killing, by Maaike Rosendal

Everything I had heard about my opponent prior to the debate at the University of Ottawa was positive and, as it turned out, also true. A young philosophy professor with an impressive curriculum vitae, Dr. Matt McLennan engaged the audience in a pleasant way and, by questioning the underlying worldview of the pro-life position as well as making a case for personhood post-sentience, provided a thought-provoking defense of abortion. But was it good enough? [Is his CV “impressive”? I think Maaike might have stated the case more precisely by saying, “I was impressed by his CV.” Whether his CV strikes you as “impressive” or not depends on who you are and what you're inclined to be impressed by (which is rather subjective). (We might wonder, for instance: Would God - as opposed to the hiring committee at St. Paul University - be "impressed" by his CV? Certainly there is room for doubt on that question.) Also, is being a "young philosophy professor" something "positive"? I'd say that lots of young (and old) philosophy professors are actually not very good or impressive people. In relation to one’s worth as a human being, “young philosophy professor” is a neutral thing, not a positive. Anyway, it sounds like Matt's a “nice” guy at least - and surely that's a good thing! (Some people seem to think that's the only thing.)]

To determine whether Dr. McLennan provided a morally and philosophically sound case for abortion, I will review his main arguments in two separate articles. We’ll take a look at his critique of the pro-life position later—in his own words, “are the secular arguments secretly religious?”—but first, let’s examine his defense of abortion on babies that aren’t sentient yet. 

In his opening statement, Dr. McLennan acknowledged that the pre-born are human beings and referred to abortion as a life-and-death issue, yet stated that opposing all abortions would be counter-intuitive and politically radical. At the same time, he was unwilling to defend all abortions because “some abortions are easier to defend than others, such as first-trimester abortions.”

The professor also explained why. “Not all abortions are alike because we’re not talking about the same human being.” How is this possible? Because in Dr. McLennan’s view, what gives a person interests is if he or she can be harmed, and this is the case once one gains sentience. [Should this be “what gives a person interests” or “what constitutes a person as such (qua person)”? Maaike is unclear on this point. Her initial claim was that Matt was making a case for personhood post-sentience. Here she indicates that his view is that a person can gain sentience, which is different from saying a being can become sentient, concomitantly also becoming a person (the latter, we should note, which is presumably Matt's actual position(?), would be a rather obviously contrived-sounding claim, badly in need of defense).] Thus, humans may come into existence at one point, which is fertilization, but it is only immoral to kill them if they have attained sentience, which is the immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness. My opponent provided his own illustration, which helps to make the implications of this view clear. If a disabled fetus has no sentience, he argued, we can allow for abortion because no harm is done. [I'm curious what's going on here: What does "disabled" have to do with it? Is this a furtive appeal to raw, naked "ableism"? Why not just, "If a fetus has no sentience..."? And why not more generally, "If a being has no sentience..."? Did Matt attempt to justify this claim? If so, how? This needs to be explained.]

Now that is the definition of functionalism, the view in which humans don’t have rights by virtue of the kind of beings they are—members of the human family—but only due to a function they can perform. [Actually no, that's not the definition of functionalism (although Maaike is of course free to use the term 'functionalism' however she wishes, provided she explains what she means).] Can’t have conscious thought? Too bad but your life doesn’t count because you don’t have certain capacities yet. Oh, and you wouldn’t know it anyway so no one really cares. [This seems inaccurate. Matt's position seems to be rather, "you have no rights because you don't have certain capacities yet. And you have no capacity for awareness, so, regardless of who "really cares," you still have no rights." ]

Sound cruel? That’s because it is. [Sound like a lame rebuttal? That's because it is.] Dr. McLennan may be well-intentioned when providing a philosophical framework that prioritizes the interests of pregnant women—as he described them, mothers who in fact are sentient beings who stand to be harmed by their pregnancies. But in reality, he allows for an entire group of other humans to be denied personhood and thus the right to life, simply because they can’t have conscious thought yet. [Yes, that's his position (I presume). But Maaike hasn't actually explained why it is cruel.]

Let’s think that through for a moment.

The reason they can’t is because they haven’t developed the capacity yet. [Right.] The reason they haven’t developed it yet is because not enough time has passed, and time is reflected in our age. [Okay.] What does that mean? In the first and for a large part the second trimester of pregnancy, the pre-born aren’t sentient simply because they aren’t old enough yet. [Not really. It's actually for the first reason: because they haven't developed enough yet.] Therefore, as I pointed out on the evening of April 4^th, to deny them the right to life for that very reason is age discrimination. [Sure: "age discrimination." But so what? The question is: Is it justified? (Lots of "discrimination," including lots of "age discrimination," is justified.) And anyway: the real issue, the real question, is about the justification for “development discrimination”; the issue is simply not one of age per se.]

Case in point? During cross examination, my opponent stated that the second trimester of pregnancy, as a result of drawing the line at sentience, is a moral “grey area.” To be clear, this trimester starts at 13 and ends at 27 weeks of pregnancy. While Dr. Fellows refuses performing abortions after 23 weeks and 6 days and the audience at uOttawa noticeably cringed at abortion footage of a bloodied, second-trimester baby being wrapped in paper to be tossed out, Dr. McLennan wasn’t willing to say it would be immoral to abort pre-born children up to 27 weeks. [Okay, that’s his position, and I agree that it's cringe-worthy. But it’s not really a “case in point” of anything preceding this paragraph - or, arguably, of anything that is actually relevant to understanding the principles that are necessary for understanding the morality of abortion.]

That, my friends, is the result of a view that deems certain humans to be mere “potential people.” In fact, the professor argued that it would be better if unwanted children, whether considered as such due to their disability, gender, or other reason, aren’t “brought into reality” as they will likely suffer and be harmed. [Did Matt really say that? If he did, he’s beginning to sound like rather a presumptuous idiot.] While he genuinely cares about equality and therefore also advocates for finding solutions to the reasons for abortion, Dr. McLennan must realize that preventing these children from being born means they must be suctioned, scraped, or torn piece-by-piece out of the womb. [He advocates “finding solutions to the reasons for abortion”? Gee, how noble… but what are the “reasons for abortion”? What does that even mean?: The reason why people actually get abortions in such great numbers? Well there are lots of reasons, but the principal one is that it is legal and is condoned and endorsed by nice, caring people like Matt, the result being that when people face an unwanted pregnancy, “abortion” is often the first thing to pop into their minds and is often very tempting - so if Matt is really advocating for finding a “solution to the reasons for abortion,” what he needs is a solution to people like himself.]

I think I know what Dr. McLennan would say in response—something similar to one of his closing remarks. “These are described as wrongs experienced by the embryos but there’s no suffering or harm done to an actual person.” Remember? They will become equal human beings like you and me but aren’t yet—not as long as they don’t have conscious thought. [Since that is supposedly his basic position, I certainly hope we can remember that. We can’t very well address his view if we’re constantly forgetting what that view is. And, note to Maaike: we shouldn’t write as if we are constantly on the verge of forgetting what Matt’s view actually is.] But we have to ask ourselves why a capacity for sentience is interest-giving in the first place. [Does Maaike mean to cast doubt on whether a capacity for sentience is interest-giving? But it seems obvious that it is. The real issue is whether it is the only thing, or the first thing, that is interest-giving – and it seems obvious that it is not.] Dr. McLennan simply asserted that humans are being harmed only once they have self-consciousness. Says who?

When I asked the professor for a reason why we should draw the line there, he responded, “Well, if I am sentient, I can be harmed,” which I repeated back to make sure I had understood his view correctly. [Assuming this is an accurate report, it becomes clear here that Matt has rather poor basic reasoning skills. (Note to Professor McLennan: modus ponens and modus tollens: good; affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent: bad). The claim he needs is the rather implausible, “If I am not sentient, I cannot be harmed,” not just, "if I am sentient, I can be harmed."] Dr. McLennan hesitated. “I believe you’re going to ask me next about sleeping people and people who are in a coma.” [Was that his full response??] Although I hadn’t planned to, that would only be the logical extension of the case he had made. If it’s not immoral to kill a pre-born human because she isn’t self-aware, how could we object to killing a born human who isn’t self-aware? To put it simply, if our level of development doesn’t matter after birth, why should it beforehand? [Clearly that’s an important question, but it’s a loaded question that misrepresents Matt’s position (as previously reported by Maaike): Matt clearly enough believes that level of development does matter before birth.]

While Dr. McLennan certainly made us think, his defense of abortion and definition of what gives people rights and interests ultimately cannot account for basic human equality. [What “basic human equality”? This is clearly a problematic concept that needs to be explained and defended, not just invoked as a slogan.] Once we draw the line anywhere later than fertilization, there is nothing that grounds our views regarding rights. [Which views regarding rights? This claim is far too hasty.] Because if humans only have rights due to some acquired property rather than by virtue of being members of the human family, all we are left with is arbitrary definitions of personhood that always leave some humans out. [Obvious objection: why can’t “being members of the human family” be construed as an acquired property? In any case, the claim that the only two options are the two proposed here by Maaike is something that needs to be argued and defended, not just assumed.]

As such, it is far more reasonable to argue that, although human beings differ immensely—there may even be times that we wouldn’t know it if we’re being harmed [“there may even be…”? – no: there obviously are times when we don’t know if we’re being harmed (think of how people used to regard smoking, or think of Professor McLennan's students)]—we are nonetheless equal. [How is this not pure assertion? Why is it “far more reasonable to argue…”? What is the argument?] Thus, the only personhood definition that leaves all humans safe [this is very naively put: no definition of personhood (or of anything else) “leaves all humans safe”] is one that acknowledges our basic human rights by virtue of our membership in the human family. That doesn’t change when our capacities change but begins the very moment we come into existence. And that, for each of us, is fertilization. [Okay: that’s Maaike’s view. Unfortunately, in relation to Matt’s view, it just seems like a lot of question-begging assertion.]