Though this idea has been voiced before, Loftus is the first to name it, rigorize it, and give it an extensive philosophical defense; moreover, by doing so, he is the first to cause a concerted apologetic to arise attempting to dodge it, to which he could then respond. The end result is one of the most effective and powerful arguments for atheism there is. It is, in effect, a covering argument that subsumes all other arguments for atheism into a common framework.Would more intelligent atheists agree with Carrier's assessment? Probably not. Jesse Parrish - arguably, a 'more intelligent atheist' - has produced a very nice critique of the OTF here. In his response to Parrish there (see the comments), Loftus ignores the argument and comes back with the following non sequitur: "Jesse, you should temper your conclusions at least somewhat since you are up against philosophers, scientists, biblical scholars, historians and psychologists who think otherwise." So already things look pretty shaky for Loftus and his 'test.'
In any case, what exactly is the OTF and how is it justified? For Loftus it is ever a work in progress, but here is one of his many formulations, carefully(?) laid out - in response to a request from a critic (Victor Reppert) - in the form of an actual argument, with premises and conclusions:
(1) Rational people in distinct geographical locations around the globe overwhelmingly adopt and defend a wide diversity of religious faiths due to their upbringing and cultural heritage. This is the religious diversity thesis.
(2) Consequently, it seems highly likely that adopting one’s religious faith is not merely a matter of independent rational judgment but is causally dependent on cultural conditions to an overwhelming degree. This is the religious dependency thesis.
(3) Hence the odds are highly likely that any given adopted religious faith is false.
(4) So the best way to test one’s adopted religious faith is from the perspective of an outsider with the same level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths. This ex-presses the OTF.
So, aside from a pretty ordinary expression of the general attitude of intellectual complacency and indifference informing the average unbeliever, what have we?
We have, first premise, that there is great religious diversity in the world, due to the great diversity of cultures. Okay, but just to be clear: religious diversity is a constituent of cultural diversity, there is no simple causal priority such that culture causes religion; religion is culture. And cultures (which would include religions, as well as currents of skepticism towards religion), Loftus notes, tend to be geographically segregated in distinct locations. Right; but so what, you ask?
Well, second, and consequently (somehow), it seems that the particular religion that any given individual adheres to can be predicted very reliably on the basis of the individual's 'cultural conditions.' The adoption of a particular religious faith is overwhelmingly dependent on cultural conditions. This general point seems obvious enough, even if Loftus has confused things by first suggesting that the issue of distinct geographical locations was somehow important, whereas what really matters is rather the individual's (presumably geographically transposable) 'cultural conditions.' Fine. But of course this dependence does not actually appear to be a consequence, as Loftus says, of religious diversity in the world - it is just one expression of the fact that human nature is, quite generally speaking, culturally-embedded (which is quite different from saying that human nature is merely a product of culture - arguably the converse is true - or just as true).
Anyway, third, Loftus further 'concludes' (not really), from the fact that cultural conditions are strongly influential in determining any given individual's religious beliefs, that the odds of any particular religious faith being false are high. Again, this is a non sequitur: the real reason for the high likelihood of any particular religious faith being false is not the fact that cultural conditions are strongly influential in determining any given individual's religious beliefs, but simply the fact that there are many religions and, since they presumably all contradict one another, at most one can be (entirely) true. (For example, think: if 90% of the world's population was Muslim, and Islam was true, this would be entirely compatible with the truth of (2) (the sociological fact about the cultural dependence of religious affiliation), even though (3) would be false, since the odds, for any given individual, of his particular religious beliefs being true, will in this case be very good.)
Fourth, Loftus 'concludes' (with yet another non sequitur) to the soundness of his OTF, namely, that the best way to test one's adopted religious faith is from the perspective of an outsider with the same level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths. So how does that follow?
First, Loftus provides no reason whatsoever in support of his claim that this is 'the best' way to test one's faith. Second, he doesn't even seem to identify any real possible way to test one's faith - how exactly one goes about taking the test he does not say. (Is there a testing centre one should go to, where an enlightened person (Loftus himself, perhaps?) will administer such a test?) Loftus does take the trouble of writing an article/blurb entitled What Does it Mean to Take and Pass the OTF?, which one might hope would answer this question. Unfortunately, instead of answering the rather crucial question, he seems more interested in congratulating himself for his cleverness in devising such a pickle for people of faith and concludes by simply informing us that anyone who has faith must take the OTF. Okay - but still: how? What does it mean to 'take the test'? (And why must everyone with faith take it? - that claim certainly has received no justification.)
So the justification is nonsense, but what to make of Loftus' so-called test, considered in itself? The only information we are given about the test here is that it is a test (1) "from the perspective of an outsider" and (2) "with the same level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths." The obvious questions here are: (1) What is "the perspective of an outsider"? (Which outsider, and why that one?) And (2) what exactly is "the level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths"? (What if, for example, a believer doesn't actually ever evaluate other religious faiths? Believers - like atheists - often have very little understanding of - and thus very little ability to evaluate - their own faith, never mind the faiths of others. Their faith isn't really based on evaluation at all.)
In another (slightly different) formulation (see here) Loftus tells us again what the OTF commands us to do: "Test or examine your religious beliefs (1) as if you were outsiders (2) with the same presumption of skepticism you use to test or examine other religious beliefs." The generality of his statement here implies that he believes that (1) any given 'outsider' will do (apparently all 'outsiders' are epistemic equals, in Loftus' mind) and that (2) every 'insider' has and uses a common (i.e., the same) standard of skepticism when testing or examining other religious beliefs (namely, "the same presumption of skepticism"). These presumptions are both patently absurd, and therefore, it appears, the OTF is patently absurd.
Loftus does have some other bad arguments in support of his view (if you want to read them, refer to previous link). For example, he thinks that the fact adduced in (3) justifies skepticism: "The OTF is no different than the prince in the Cinderella story who must question forty-five thousand girls to see which one lost the glass slipper at the ball last night. They all claim to have done so. Therefore, skepticism is definitely warranted." But this is another non sequitur. It is not skepticism that is 'definitely warranted,' but diligent investigation. Being deceived by some winsome-footed non-Cinderella is really not bad in itself, except that such a deception would prevent the prince from finding the real Cinderella. If Loftus-style skepticism towards religions had the analogous no-Cinderella result (and why might it not?), then it would be just as bad.
Loftus writes further: "The amount of skepticism warranted depends on the number of rational people who disagree, whether the people who disagree are separated into distinct geographical locations, the nature of those beliefs, how they originated, how they were personally adopted in the first place, and the kinds of evidence that can possibly be used to decide between them. My claim is that when it comes to religious beliefs a high degree of skepticism is warranted because of these factors." Again, this is a hopelessly vague non sequitur, not any kind of sound argument. If rational people disagree about some important matter we should not want to adopt skepticism, but to know what their arguments are! If the people live in different places, this is entirely irrelevant to evaluating the epistemic standing of their respective beliefs! Obviously we should want to consider "the nature of those beliefs," but it hardly follows from the bare fact that we have considered 'the nature' of certain beliefs that skepticism will be warranted, - that will depend on what the particular 'nature of those beliefs' turns out to be! And so on.
In the premises of his argument Loftus has raised certain obvious facts about how religious belief is transmitted, but his premises make no mention whatsoever of religious reasoning. Thus, they make no reference to any facts that are actually relevant to assessing his conclusion, which is about how to reason well about religious faith, so as to avoid confirmation bias. Strange argument. It thus turns out that all that Loftus' test and justification thereof amounts to is the wholly unsubstantiated assertion of the virtue of adopting a priori skepticism towards all religious beliefs, which assertion appears to be based on patently absurd assumptions about the uniformly divergent epistemic standards respectively obtaining among 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of religion.
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