Comments on Maaike Rosendal's "A professor's case for killing"

The following are comments on part one of Maaike Rosendal's assessment of a debate in which she participated, back in April, at the University of Ottawa. It sounds like it might have been interesting. It would be interesting to hear how Matt would reply to Maaike's report of the debate and the arguments she presents. With due respect, it seems that Maaike needs to work on developing better reasoning skills and a better grasp of the issues. Here's my take (part one):

A professor’s case for killing, by Maaike Rosendal

Everything I had heard about my opponent prior to the debate at the University of Ottawa was positive and, as it turned out, also true. A young philosophy professor with an impressive curriculum vitae, Dr. Matt McLennan engaged the audience in a pleasant way and, by questioning the underlying worldview of the pro-life position as well as making a case for personhood post-sentience, provided a thought-provoking defense of abortion. But was it good enough? [Is his CV “impressive”? I think Maaike might have stated the case more precisely by saying, “I was impressed by his CV.” Whether his CV strikes you as “impressive” or not depends on who you are and what you're inclined to be impressed by (which is rather subjective). (We might wonder, for instance: Would God - as opposed to the hiring committee at St. Paul University - be "impressed" by his CV? Certainly there is room for doubt on that question.) Also, is being a "young philosophy professor" something "positive"? I'd say that lots of young (and old) philosophy professors are actually not very good or impressive people. In relation to one’s worth as a human being, “young philosophy professor” is a neutral thing, not a positive. Anyway, it sounds like Matt's a “nice” guy at least - and surely that's a good thing! (Some people seem to think that's the only thing.)]

To determine whether Dr. McLennan provided a morally and philosophically sound case for abortion, I will review his main arguments in two separate articles. We’ll take a look at his critique of the pro-life position later—in his own words, “are the secular arguments secretly religious?”—but first, let’s examine his defense of abortion on babies that aren’t sentient yet. 

In his opening statement, Dr. McLennan acknowledged that the pre-born are human beings and referred to abortion as a life-and-death issue, yet stated that opposing all abortions would be counter-intuitive and politically radical. At the same time, he was unwilling to defend all abortions because “some abortions are easier to defend than others, such as first-trimester abortions.”

The professor also explained why. “Not all abortions are alike because we’re not talking about the same human being.” How is this possible? Because in Dr. McLennan’s view, what gives a person interests is if he or she can be harmed, and this is the case once one gains sentience. [Should this be “what gives a person interests” or “what constitutes a person as such (qua person)”? Maaike is unclear on this point. Her initial claim was that Matt was making a case for personhood post-sentience. Here she indicates that his view is that a person can gain sentience, which is different from saying a being can become sentient, concomitantly also becoming a person (the latter, we should note, which is presumably Matt's actual position(?), would be a rather obviously contrived-sounding claim, badly in need of defense).] Thus, humans may come into existence at one point, which is fertilization, but it is only immoral to kill them if they have attained sentience, which is the immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness. My opponent provided his own illustration, which helps to make the implications of this view clear. If a disabled fetus has no sentience, he argued, we can allow for abortion because no harm is done. [I'm curious what's going on here: What does "disabled" have to do with it? Is this a furtive appeal to raw, naked "ableism"? Why not just, "If a fetus has no sentience..."? And why not more generally, "If a being has no sentience..."? Did Matt attempt to justify this claim? If so, how? This needs to be explained.]

Now that is the definition of functionalism, the view in which humans don’t have rights by virtue of the kind of beings they are—members of the human family—but only due to a function they can perform. [Actually no, that's not the definition of functionalism (although Maaike is of course free to use the term 'functionalism' however she wishes, provided she explains what she means).] Can’t have conscious thought? Too bad but your life doesn’t count because you don’t have certain capacities yet. Oh, and you wouldn’t know it anyway so no one really cares. [This seems inaccurate. Matt's position seems to be rather, "you have no rights because you don't have certain capacities yet. And you have no capacity for awareness, so, regardless of who "really cares," you still have no rights." ]

Sound cruel? That’s because it is. [Sound like a lame rebuttal? That's because it is.] Dr. McLennan may be well-intentioned when providing a philosophical framework that prioritizes the interests of pregnant women—as he described them, mothers who in fact are sentient beings who stand to be harmed by their pregnancies. But in reality, he allows for an entire group of other humans to be denied personhood and thus the right to life, simply because they can’t have conscious thought yet. [Yes, that's his position (I presume). But Maaike hasn't actually explained why it is cruel.]

Let’s think that through for a moment.

The reason they can’t is because they haven’t developed the capacity yet. [Right.] The reason they haven’t developed it yet is because not enough time has passed, and time is reflected in our age. [Okay.] What does that mean? In the first and for a large part the second trimester of pregnancy, the pre-born aren’t sentient simply because they aren’t old enough yet. [Not really. It's actually for the first reason: because they haven't developed enough yet.] Therefore, as I pointed out on the evening of April 4^th, to deny them the right to life for that very reason is age discrimination. [Sure: "age discrimination." But so what? The question is: Is it justified? (Lots of "discrimination," including lots of "age discrimination," is justified.) And anyway: the real issue, the real question, is about the justification for “development discrimination”; the issue is simply not one of age per se.]

Case in point? During cross examination, my opponent stated that the second trimester of pregnancy, as a result of drawing the line at sentience, is a moral “grey area.” To be clear, this trimester starts at 13 and ends at 27 weeks of pregnancy. While Dr. Fellows refuses performing abortions after 23 weeks and 6 days and the audience at uOttawa noticeably cringed at abortion footage of a bloodied, second-trimester baby being wrapped in paper to be tossed out, Dr. McLennan wasn’t willing to say it would be immoral to abort pre-born children up to 27 weeks. [Okay, that’s his position, and I agree that it's cringe-worthy. But it’s not really a “case in point” of anything preceding this paragraph - or, arguably, of anything that is actually relevant to understanding the principles that are necessary for understanding the morality of abortion.]

That, my friends, is the result of a view that deems certain humans to be mere “potential people.” In fact, the professor argued that it would be better if unwanted children, whether considered as such due to their disability, gender, or other reason, aren’t “brought into reality” as they will likely suffer and be harmed. [Did Matt really say that? If he did, he’s beginning to sound like rather a presumptuous idiot.] While he genuinely cares about equality and therefore also advocates for finding solutions to the reasons for abortion, Dr. McLennan must realize that preventing these children from being born means they must be suctioned, scraped, or torn piece-by-piece out of the womb. [He advocates “finding solutions to the reasons for abortion”? Gee, how noble… but what are the “reasons for abortion”? What does that even mean?: The reason why people actually get abortions in such great numbers? Well there are lots of reasons, but the principal one is that it is legal and is condoned and endorsed by nice, caring people like Matt, the result being that when people face an unwanted pregnancy, “abortion” is often the first thing to pop into their minds and is often very tempting - so if Matt is really advocating for finding a “solution to the reasons for abortion,” what he needs is a solution to people like himself.]

I think I know what Dr. McLennan would say in response—something similar to one of his closing remarks. “These are described as wrongs experienced by the embryos but there’s no suffering or harm done to an actual person.” Remember? They will become equal human beings like you and me but aren’t yet—not as long as they don’t have conscious thought. [Since that is supposedly his basic position, I certainly hope we can remember that. We can’t very well address his view if we’re constantly forgetting what that view is. And, note to Maaike: we shouldn’t write as if we are constantly on the verge of forgetting what Matt’s view actually is.] But we have to ask ourselves why a capacity for sentience is interest-giving in the first place. [Does Maaike mean to cast doubt on whether a capacity for sentience is interest-giving? But it seems obvious that it is. The real issue is whether it is the only thing, or the first thing, that is interest-giving – and it seems obvious that it is not.] Dr. McLennan simply asserted that humans are being harmed only once they have self-consciousness. Says who?

When I asked the professor for a reason why we should draw the line there, he responded, “Well, if I am sentient, I can be harmed,” which I repeated back to make sure I had understood his view correctly. [Assuming this is an accurate report, it becomes clear here that Matt has rather poor basic reasoning skills. (Note to Professor McLennan: modus ponens and modus tollens: good; affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent: bad). The claim he needs is the rather implausible, “If I am not sentient, I cannot be harmed,” not just, "if I am sentient, I can be harmed."] Dr. McLennan hesitated. “I believe you’re going to ask me next about sleeping people and people who are in a coma.” [Was that his full response??] Although I hadn’t planned to, that would only be the logical extension of the case he had made. If it’s not immoral to kill a pre-born human because she isn’t self-aware, how could we object to killing a born human who isn’t self-aware? To put it simply, if our level of development doesn’t matter after birth, why should it beforehand? [Clearly that’s an important question, but it’s a loaded question that misrepresents Matt’s position (as previously reported by Maaike): Matt clearly enough believes that level of development does matter before birth.]

While Dr. McLennan certainly made us think, his defense of abortion and definition of what gives people rights and interests ultimately cannot account for basic human equality. [What “basic human equality”? This is clearly a problematic concept that needs to be explained and defended, not just invoked as a slogan.] Once we draw the line anywhere later than fertilization, there is nothing that grounds our views regarding rights. [Which views regarding rights? This claim is far too hasty.] Because if humans only have rights due to some acquired property rather than by virtue of being members of the human family, all we are left with is arbitrary definitions of personhood that always leave some humans out. [Obvious objection: why can’t “being members of the human family” be construed as an acquired property? In any case, the claim that the only two options are the two proposed here by Maaike is something that needs to be argued and defended, not just assumed.]

As such, it is far more reasonable to argue that, although human beings differ immensely—there may even be times that we wouldn’t know it if we’re being harmed [“there may even be…”? – no: there obviously are times when we don’t know if we’re being harmed (think of how people used to regard smoking, or think of Professor McLennan's students)]—we are nonetheless equal. [How is this not pure assertion? Why is it “far more reasonable to argue…”? What is the argument?] Thus, the only personhood definition that leaves all humans safe [this is very naively put: no definition of personhood (or of anything else) “leaves all humans safe”] is one that acknowledges our basic human rights by virtue of our membership in the human family. That doesn’t change when our capacities change but begins the very moment we come into existence. And that, for each of us, is fertilization. [Okay: that’s Maaike’s view. Unfortunately, in relation to Matt’s view, it just seems like a lot of question-begging assertion.]

Letter to Bishop Riesbeck on First Communion and Confirmation

I sent the following letter to Bishop Riesbeck (who is also diocesan chancellor). Perhaps as a kind of voice crying out in the wilderness, I thought it might be worth sharing its contents more widely. Comments are welcome (as always).


To: The Most Reverend Christian Riesbeck, CC, Auxiliary Bishop of Ottawa
Date: October 14, 2014

Your Excellency:

Our eldest son is in Grade 2 this year and in accordance with diocesan policy we have been invited to prepare him for his first Communion (as well as first Confession). We have some concerns about this regarding which our pastor advised me to write to you.

We wish to be faithful in fulfilling our duties as Catholic parents, we wish to keep the promises we made when Isaac was baptised (especially: “You have asked to have your child baptized. In doing so you are accepting the responsibility of training him (her) in the practice of the faith”), and we wish to live in the spirit of the blessing pronounced upon us at his baptism (especially: “God is the giver of all life, human and divine. May he bless the father of this child. He and his wife will be the first teachers of their child in the ways of faith. May they be also the best of teachers, bearing witness to the faith by what they say and do, in Christ Jesus our Lord.”). In order to teach our son “the ways of faith,” we try to do so with reference to authoritative and reliable sources, so that we hand on the authentic Catholic faith.

As I understand it, the universal Catechism published in the early 1990’s is supposed to constitute a “sure norm for teaching the faith,” so I take this as a primary point of reference. In the first paragraph of the section on the Eucharist, the Catechism reads:

CCC 1322: “The holy Eucharist completes Christian initiation. Those who have been raised to the dignity of the royal priesthood by Baptism and configured more deeply to Christ by Confirmation participate with the whole community in the Lord's own sacrifice by means of the Eucharist.”

I read this as indicating that Confirmation, like Baptism, should precede reception of the holy Eucharist, since it is “the holy Eucharist” which “completes Christian initiation.” I think this is even more clear in Pope Paul VI’s 1971 Apostolic Constitution on Confirmation, Divinae consortium naturae: the ordering of the sacraments of initiation is first Baptism, second Confirmation, and lastly (the “summit”) Eucharist. (At the same time, I do recognize that it is possible to licitly receive Communion without having been Confirmed, while it is not possible to licitly or even validly receive Confirmation without having first been Baptized.) I don’t see how this claim of CCC 1322 is compatible with receiving the holy Eucharist (which is supposed to complete Christian initiation) in grade 2, and then receiving Confirmation (without which Christian initiation remains incomplete (cf. CCC 1306)) four years later in grade 6. In light of what I understand the Catechism to say, this current diocesan policy would seem to imply that for children between grades 2 and 6, their Christian initiation during this four year period is both complete (thanks to the holy Eucharist) and incomplete (since they have not been Confirmed), at the same time.

I will be grateful to be enlightened about this, but in the meantime, as a believer in the compatibility between faith and reason, this state of affairs rather unsettles me. Further, I humbly suggest that this policy inherently lends itself to generalized theological confusion regarding the specific nature of each of the sacraments and their ordering towards one another. I think there is a tendency, in light of this policy, for people (parents, children, pastors) to regard Confirmation as a second-rate sacrament, an after-thought, which we will (probably) get back to, but only after we’ve visited the summit (the Eucharist); and/or a tendency to obscure the fact that the Eucharist is the summit, and is indeed (unless I have misinterpreted CCC 1322) supposed to complete Christian initiation. Finally, most Catholics I have talked to seem to think that Confirmation is more or less equivalent to a Protestant altar call where a young person is deemed/deems himself mature enough to decide and publicly announce that he personally accepts Jesus into his heart as his Lord and Saviour (or just that he want to be a Catholic), as opposed to a Catholic sacrament, instituted by Christ to freely confer grace. I, of course, do not mean to intimate that I suppose the pastoral motivation behind the diocesan policy is to encourage this kind of attitude, but I think the policy does feed into this common misconception.

Over the past few months I have discussed this matter with three different priests of the diocese. Two of the three were markedly sympathetic to my concerns and actually mentioned that they would prefer we followed the practice of the Eastern Churches of conferring Confirmation on infants at the time of their Baptism. Each of them mentioned some of the history of the changes in diocesan policy and mentioned that there had been a letter explaining the current policy sent out some years ago, but none of them was currently prepared/inclined to give an explanation or defense of the policy on their own behalf. On the diocesan Chancery website I do find a link entitled “Revised policy on the sacrament of confirmation,” but the link is not currently functional (that is, at the time of my writing).

In Christian humility, we wish to obey the lawful pastors of the Church. At the same time, as parents, we wish to conscientiously carry out our duties as the primary educators of our children. In light of the foregoing considerations, then, we would like to request, first, an explanation of the diocesan policy on these matters, in particular in relation to the seemingly problematic, i.e., incompatible, passages from the Catechism; and, second, permission for our son to be Confirmed this year, having reached the “age of discretion” (CCC 1307) (and pending appropriate instruction and preparation) such that he “can and should receive the sacrament of Confirmation” (CCC 1306). (Please note that in making this request my understanding is that such a request might be unusual but is not unprecedented and is indeed canonically warranted - see, for example, http://www.canonlaw.info/a_preparingchildren.htm).

 

Yours in Christ,

 ...

On Heresy Hunter's "Litany of Stupid Saints"

Here it is: a Litany of Stupid Saints, by Heresy Hunter. Go ahead, read it. (Do it now - at least the first paragraph. Please.) ... Now for comment.

First of all, I think the litany is pretty funny. But is it fair? That depends on what we understand the point to be.

If the point is simply to pillory the views of Jorge Bergoglio/Pope Francis, then it's not really fair (at least not all of it). Taking just the first point on 'proselytism': Pope Francis (reportedly) said, "Proselytism is solemn nonsense, it makes no sense. We need to get to know each other, listen to each other and improve our knowledge of the world around us... This is important: to get to know people, listen, expand the circle of ideas." Now logically, being sensitive to the whole context, 'proselytism' here should be taken to refer specifically to a way of spreading/sharing the gospel which is somehow opposed to getting to know those being evangelized; which getting to know would obviously have to include listening to them (not just preaching to them); and which listening, one would hope, should result in an improved knowledge of the world around us and an expansion of the "circle" of ideas (or of the "triangle" - or "sphere" or "polyhedron" or whatever geometrical or non-geometrical figure of speech you happen to prefer - of ideas).

Now clearly 'proselytism,' thus defined, can creditably enough be charged with making no sense. And certainly that kind of 'proselytism' is not at all the kind of proselytism that was practised by Gabriel Lalemant, Jean de Brebeuf, Isaac Jogues, and the other NA martyrs (not to mention the proselytism of Peter Faber, who is obviously dear to the pope). As a matter of strict necessity, the Jesuit missionaries had to listen to and get to know the people they were sent to, they had to expand their own knowledge, before they could even begin to make disciples and teach the Amerindians to obey the commandments given by Jesus. (This is too obvious, really!) So Hunter's criticisms on this point, taken straight up, are not fair. In fact, taken straight up, they make no sense! (Score one for Bergoglio.)

On the other hand, the "litany of stupid saints" is - I hope you didn't miss this! - satirical. As such, instead of directly attacking Francis' views - i.e., what Francis really thinks -, I think the point could be taken to be about Francis' ability to communicate - i.e., the unfortunate things Frances sometimes actually says. It's not fair to say based on what Francis says that he is fundamentally stupid or 'un-Catholic' and that he would actually accept the stupid or 'un-Catholic' implications (or likely interpretations) of some of the things he says (and which we hear so much about, thanks to our ever-vigilant and unfailingly balanced news media). It is fair to say, however, that he is, at least in some respects, a poor communicator - at least insofar as a better communicator would understand in advance the implications of whatever words he might choose and so (presumably) find and use words that didn't have such silly/false/scandalous implications (or probable interpretations).

So on the whole, I approve of this piece of satire. Read appropriately, it made some important points: Francis tends to say things which, at least as they are likely to be interpreted by the ordinary person, would be objectively foolish and false. Thus, the Pope's words have rather naturally led many people to think that these are the Pope's actual beliefs - which presumably, all things considered, they are not, even though many people (who do actually hold such objectively foolish beliefs) evidently wish they were. (This is, of course, a vague generalization, and only a vague generalization.)

But a note of caution: Others could easily read the piece differently: They could interpret it as simply being a witty demonstration of what a lousy Catholic our Pope is. I don't think that is the most charitable reading of the litany, simply because this interpretation would have Hunter attempting to make a point that is objectively foolish and untrue to the reality: the litany demonstrates no such thing.

But how to avoid such uncharitable interpretations? In general, unfortunately, it's not actually possible: People will hear what they want to hear (it's part of that 'hardness of heart' thing you find here and there in the Bible). But perhaps this might be a helpful principle: "We need to get to know each other, listen to each other and improve our knowledge of the world around us... This is important: to get to know people, listen, expand the circle of ideas." Insofar as one natural interpretation of the litany would actually tend to undermine this authentic Jesuit principle, it would, under this interpretation, be a rather counter-productive and self-refuting piece of satire.

Christopher West: "naked without shame"?

If Christopher West is "naked without shame," should we think of Genesis 2:25, or The Emperor's New Clothes? (C'mon - it's an innocent question!)

I recently finished listening to Christopher West's "Naked Without Shame" talks, recorded in 2002, which one can listen to here. (It's free!) It was painful at times, but interesting. One of the most persistent questions I had while listening was, what do people see in this guy? Why is he so popular? Thinking about it, I realized I actually have the same question about a lot of things. In particular I have this question about (certain) televangelists (Oprah, for example). And if I had two words to describe the way West's talks struck me, they would perhaps be "annoying televangelist."

"Now that's not very nice!" you might think, especially if you're a CWest fan, and maybe you're right. But I don't think there's much substance in such a reaction. So what if it's "not very nice"?: You still need to ask: Is it just (as an assessment)? Is it justified (i.e., worth mentioning)? Well, not necessarily, I suppose.

For instance, I remember the reaction of one American 'journalist' to the election of Pope Benedict (way back in 2005): her comment was that he wasn't the right man for the job, partly because (according to her) he had an ugly face (I believe she actually used the expression "unfortunate visage"). Now that assessment is also "not very nice," but that's not the real problem with it. The real problem is that it's incredibly shallow and stupid.

So I suppose someone might think that characterizing West's talks as "annoying televangelism" is also, besides "not very nice," shallow and stupid. But the question is whether that would be correct. So what grounds my characterization?

To begin with, annoying televangelists may be basically good people, doing basically good work. So you can't say, "Now you listen to me: He's a good man, doing good work! Therefore it's not fair to compare him to annoying televangelists." That doesn't follow.

But if all there was to my impression of CWest as an annoying televangelist was, say, an antipathy to the man's style, then I suppose it wouldn't be very nice to mention it (publicly, at least), and probably there would be no justification for mentioning it - other than, say, if I was explaining to someone why I can't get too excited about his apostolate.

But as to whether my characterization might be stupid and shallow (and obviously I hope it's not!), it's important to recognize that "annoying televangelist" is not at all on the level of "unfortunate visage." But if it indeed is not, then what is the substance of this characterization?

To begin with, granted: annoying televangelists are typically primarily annoying because of their style. (And this does apply in the case of my reaction to CWest - it's just annoying, the way he talks, all of the exaggerated intonations and emphases, the dumb jokes, the bombast.)

But beyond style, I would associate two things with such characters: while they may present a message that is good in itself, they tend to present it in a shallow, demagogic way; and besides promoting the authentic message - that is, the one which they claim to be promoting -, they tend to be self-promoting, and in ways that obscure or corrupt the authentic message.

Now it seems to me that a good televangelist need not and should not be annoying. (Joel Osteen, for example, is only a little bit annoying.) And he need not and should not be a shallow self-promoter. Rather, he should be able to present things in a simple way, for a general audience, without saying things that are shallow, that are plain nonsense, or that are misleading and demagogical (i.e., 'rabble-rousing,' manipulating the crowd through popular emotions, prejudices, and fears). And this is to say that he should also be able to promote his message, and (incidentally) promote himself (there's nothing per se wrong with this), but without deviating from the authenticity of the message, which should always include the implicit aim of stimulating people to think clearly, critically, and reflectively. And if I'm not mistaken, "Naked Without Shame" deserves criticism on both these counts (shallowness and self-promotion).

To demonstrate that this assessment is correct would require some detailed analysis of the various things West actually says in his talks (and maybe I'll do some of that at some point). But I think there are also serious problems with the overall thrust of West's fundamental message. I think Fr. Angelo Geiger correctly identifies the main one, namely, his (rhetorical, at least) rejection of a hermeneutic of continuity (see below), which I would express by saying that his message is fundamentally Protestant. That is to say, he (implicitly) dismisses the constant teaching tradition of the Church from the time of the Apostles and (explicitly) preaches a theological revolution (whether he does so in reality, or primarily just  rhetorically, is another question). There is nothing wrong with reformation (i.e., reform) within the Church. But the Protestant Reformation was a revolution, a revolt, a rejection of the real, visible, historic Church, and the creation of new, alternate institutions, fundamentally conceived as invisible, spiritual realities (invisibly united and visibly fragmented), precisely in opposition to the visible, historic church founded by the apostles and shepherded by their successors.

I imagine West might deny that his message is at all 'Protestant,' because he thinks he is promoting the message of the pope ("it's the pope, for crying out loud!"), and perhaps he thinks that it follows that his message must be Catholic. But it seems to me that in fact there's nothing authentically 'Catholic' about painting the pope as a theological revolutionary in relation to the first 2000 years of the Church, and it seems absurd to think that John Paul II himself would ever accept this characterization of his "theology of the body" or of his own pontificate. But, of course, "the pope has announced a theological revolution and I am its messenger" is a message which can play well to certain audiences and can serve as very effective self-promotion - it certainly simplifies things if we can shuffle aside the first 1500 years of the Church and focus on the Bible alone, or shuffle aside the first 2000 years of the Church and focus on four-years-worth of weekly catechetical addresses offered in the early 1980's by one pope (the 263rd successor of Peter, by the way). But teaching people to thank God for JPII and his TOB, and implicitly to thank God that they didn't live under any of those pre-TOB-revolution popes (who are collectively remarkable for their utter failure to publish any writings about the timing of sexual climaxes and such), is a highly dubious brand of 'Catholicism.'

Of course, the real focus of West's apostolate maybe just isn't on helping people to love the truth, and especially the highest and deepest truths - that is, his focus is not really theological, per se. Instead he's reaching out primarily to people who are psychologically wounded and warped by the lies of the 'sexual revolution,' so the fine points of truth and logic and the bigger picture of Catholic faith are extraneous to the narrow, essentially therapeutic purpose of his talks. That's fine. And this might be an effective propaedeutic to theology.

The problem, however, is that West sells himself as offering (and presumably actually aims to offer) something much more profound and universal than this, and this being the case, he does not have the right to just ignore the errors and un-Catholic tendencies in his position, even if these happen to be incidental to whatever immediate and real therapeutic value there is in his message.

In any case, 2002 is a while back now, so here's hoping that West has matured to the point where he no longer sees fit to deal with critics by assigning question-begging derogatory labels to them while ignoring their actual critiques. (To paraphrase West's strategy (at least back in 2002): "Well the Pharisees didn't like it when Jesus preached the gospel either" and "My critics are 'liberals' or 'conservatives' - but I'm Catholic!" [enthusiastic applause from the adoring crowd; eye-rolls from critics].)

...


Fr. Angelo Geiger makes some excellent points about West's "blind spot" here. An excerpt:

West is easily interpreted as suggesting that without TOB Catholics have never had any clear vision of what God's intention for human sexuality was from the beginning. Otherwise, would he not make a greater effort to teach chastity with a hermeneutic of continuity instead of concentrating almost exclusively on a very narrow part of magisterial teaching on human sexuality? It seems he is suggesting that our past has been clouded by puritanism because we did not have TOB, and our future will be the age of the love banquet because we do.

Is my interpretation of West a bit facile? But this is the problem with trying to popularize a work of deep theology and philosophy. It is not even clear to me whether West is engaged in apologetics or catechesis. The two are not the same thing. Apologetics is a kind of preamble to catechesis that elicits the assent of faith in respect to difficult truths by way of arguments that are easily understood and appealing to someone who has no basic understanding of revelation. Catechesis is sacramental preparation or ongoing education, based on faith already elicited.

Granted, the two overlap: Catechumens will often have to come to terms with issues they have a hard time with before their initial catechesis is completed, but apologetical explanations are not sufficient to complete a catechesis. If a new vision of human sexuality gets them in the door, only the tradition of the ages will get them to the sanctuary. In either case, TOB is not easily distilled to those who are relatively uninitiated.

The fact is the fundamental problem with human sexuality, even in the Victorian age and that of the sexual revolution is original sin. West acknowledges the fact of original sin when he says:

Of course, on this side of heaven, we will always be able to recognize a battle in our hearts between love and lust. Only in eternity will the battle cease, as will marriage as we know it.

But he says this only in passing. His real point is the following:

There will be no renewal of the Church and the world without a renewal of marriage and the family. And there will be no renewal of marriage and the family without a return to the full truth of the Christian sexual ethic. This will not happen, however, unless we can find a compelling way to demonstrate to the modern world that the biblical vision of sexuality is not the prudish list of prohibitions it is so often assumed to be, but rather it is the banquet of love for which we so desperately yearn.

West is right that many do assume that the Church's "vision of sexuality" is a "prudish list of prohibitions," but the vast majority of people today assume that the prohibition of fornication, contraception and soft-core pornography is prudish. Is Hefner really a pornographer because of prudery, or is perhaps the "Playboy Philosophy" just an obsessive rationalization for lust? I am not saying that prudery was not a factor in Hefner's life, but it simply does not account for the extent of his monumentally prurient behavior. So is prudery the real problem? I think our real work is not to show how TOB rescued the biblical vision of sexuality, but to show how the teaching of the Church in general has been misinterpreted.

I said that my problem with West's presentation is his interpretation of the past and the future and the way in which the present age of TOB is the hermeneutical key for both. What I mean is that his fundamental interpretation of the past is prudery and his fundamental interpretation of the future is something akin to original innocence. Original sin gets lost in the shuffle. The message is that we've got to be positive. "Think good thoughts via TOB," we are told, "and everything will settle down."

It's not going to happen. It's not. 

Doctors refusing to prescribe birth control pills?!

This is a story from an actual newspaper(!):
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Some+Ottawa+doctors+refuse+prescribe+birth+control+pills/9450917/story.html

 

An excerpt:

OTTAWA — At least three Ottawa family physicians are refusing to prescribe birth control pills or any form of contraception for their patients, saying doing so conflicts with their “medical judgment, professional ethical concerns and religious values.”

The doctors, who work at Care-Medics Medical Centres in Ottawa, distribute letters to patients informing them of their positions, according to office staff there. A copy of one of the letters, signed by Dr. Edmond Kyrillos, has been posted on Facebook through a group called Radical Handmaids.

The letter informs patients that the doctor only provides one form of birth control, “Natural Family Planning.”

“In addition, I do not refer for vasectomies, abortions nor prescribe the morning after pill or any artificial contraception. If you are interested in the latter, please be aware that you may approach your own family doctor or request to be seen by another physician.”

...

Radical Handmaids, which describes itself as a group of pro-choice advocates, said the letter was sent to them anonymously by a woman in Ottawa. “Yes this is a real doctor. No you are not in a time warp,” the posting read.

Among comments was this one from Kate Suppa: “When you become a doctor, you take an oath to do not harm. Impeding someone’s ability to receive the care they need is doing harm and should not be legal.”

[Etc.] 

My reaction?

OMG, sisters! Can you, like, believe this story? In Canada, in 2014, we still have practising physicians who have, like, 'moral values' and non-mainstream 'medical judgments.' WTF! If someone doesn't ban these people, I am so moving to Quebec. This kind of independence cannot be tolerated. We need to do a much better job of forcing our tolerant and progressive values, the sacred values of the anti-religious secular feminist state, upon those who dare to dissent. Let's go, long-suffering sisters (and the brave sensitive men who support them): let's womyn the barricades, let's crush these outliers! We must not let our clocks run backwards - now more than ever we must cling to our grand narrative of 'progress' and 'enlightenment' (in a pragmatic way, of course, that is, when it's convenient).

Gay Marriage Advocacy

This is seriously about how intelligent and open-minded a lot of (most?) gay marriage advocates are (at least qua gay marriage advocates, that is, as regards their advocacy of gay marriage):

"You're a homophobe."
"How so?"
"Come on! You don't believe in gay marriage."
"That's true, but why should that imply that I'm a homophobe."
"Listen: most people these days would think you're a homophobe if you don't believe in gay marriage - therefore you're a homophobe."
"So if most people believe something, then it must be true?"
"No. ... But I think you're a homophobe."
"How so?"
"You don't believe in gay marriage."
"That's true, but..."
[etc.]

Intellectual curiosity vs. intellectual dishonesty

Intellectual curiosity is a vital antidote against intellectual dishonesty (and is necessary, though not sufficient, for intellectual flourishing), whereas a lack of intellectual curiosity is an excellent bellwether for intellectual dishonesty (where intellectual curiosity is lacking, intellectual dishonesty is sure to be found not far away).

Supposing that might be true, what is intellectual curiosity? It’s certainly very different from – though not necessarily incompatible with –, say, a fondness for picking up and spouting arcane jargon. Rather, it’s a natural inclination of healthy human beings to feel wonder in the face of things and people and ideas and a desire to learn to properly understand and appreciate all these things for what(ever) they truly are.

It seems to me that someone who says, “There’s no point in us discussing such and such an issue, because we have very different fundamental views about such and such (about the world, about truth, about human nature, etc.)” is very likely lacking in intellectual curiosity (and thus likely prone to intellectual dishonesty). Such a person simply doesn’t want to understand anything different from what she already understands. She is perhaps rather similar to a skittish horse, which simply can’t function properly – can’t placidly plod along – without blinders on to shut out distractions and to keep its gaze focused on its given task.

 

Now there’s nothing really wrong with someone having a narrow focus, so long as that person has a clearly defined job to do and she needs to stay focused on just getting that job done. But some of the tasks which life imposes on us are just not like that. If you have a wild horse, for example, that needs to keep track of the rest of the herd, be on guard against predators, etc., the horse needs to be able to look around and see what is what, to assess, in its own horsy way of assessing things, the ‘big picture’ of what is going on around it. Blinders are a bad idea in this kind of situation.

And this is the kind of situation that human beings are in when they have fundamental disagreements with the other human beings with whom they live. Whenever disagreements arise, it is always possible to just take up arms – whether physical or verbal – and attack, or to just plug one's ears and hole up in one’s ideological fortress. But most of us can see that this is a vicious kind of response, not worthy of a human being. It is a corruption of our intellectual curiosity -- even if it is one which, to some extent, inevitably occurs, given the sickness (or just feebleness) that, with varying severity, infects every human being. But it is also something that we can commit ourselves to working against, because, while it clearly is a sickness of our race, still, whatever psychoses do affect us, the undeniable existence of intellectual curiosity – which is as undeniable as the existence of children – continues to speak to us of the metaphysical possibility and the moral necessity of working to overcome such psychoses (that is, such losses of contact with reality).

Not that the evident existence of intellectual curiosity necessarily speaks to all of us. It is possible to become like the Dwarfs in C.S. Lewis’ beautiful depiction in The Last Battle of the death of intellectual curiosity. The Dwarfs decide that they’re on their own and they will only look out for each other. They are little skeptics who don’t want to be taken in by any grand tales (any ‘metanarratives’), who aren’t interested in serving any grand cause, so they refuse to believe in any ‘truth’ except that “the Dwarfs are for the Dwarfs.” They viciously and gleefully attack anyone who is outside of their clique and even when their plight becomes evidently hopeless they refuse to receive any help from others:

    “Well, at any rate there’s no Humbug here. We haven’t let anyone take us in. The Dwarfs are for the Dwarfs.”
    “You see,” said Aslan. “They will not let us help them. They have chosen cunning instead of belief. Their prison is only in their own minds, yet they are in that prison; and so afraid of being taken in that they cannot be taken out…”

The Dwarfs are beautifully depicted because they are so true to life. At first they are almost frighteningly ugly, like the recent disgustingly ugly display put on by abortion zealots in Argentina. But in the end we can see that they are simply and tragically ridiculous.* (And it strikes me as more than coincidental that you very rarely (if ever) see a Dwarf child in Narnia – and that such vitriolic contempt for the lives even of innocent little children should be found together with a similar spitting, chanting, sneering contempt for intellectual curiosity in Argentina.)

[*Even though, in Lewis' account, it's also true that they are still not entirely beyond the possibility of finally accepting redemption.]