Jacques Philippe on God's love of deficiencies

My wife was telling me that other day that the buzz in her Catholic mommy crowd this lent is about some book on peace by Rev. Jacques Philippe. Philippe is a member of the Community of the Beatitudes in France and a very widely read author of works described as “classics of modern Catholic spirituality.” We don’t have the peace book but we do have his Interior Freedom. I’d picked it up before, read about a quarter of it and lost interest, but inspired by the reported buzz I took another look at it last night. There I read this fascinating doctrine:

“We find it so difficult to accept our own deficiencies because we imagine they make us unlovable. Since we are defective in this or that aspect, we feel that we do not deserve to be loved. Living under God’s gaze makes us realize how mistaken that is. Love is given freely, it’s not deserved, and our deficiencies don’t prevent God from loving us – just the opposite!”

Ah yes, just the opposite: that means deficiencies actually allow, cause, encourage God’s love in some way, evidently, that would otherwise be prevented! So the Catholic doctrine of merit? That’s probably a bit complicated, so maybe some other time. For now just remember, our deficiencies actually allow God to love us more, and thus a lack of deficiencies actually somehow prevents, inhibits God’s love for us, apparently because God is our Father, and as any father will tell you, it is the deficiencies in our children which allow us to love them all the more. (Right??) Thus, by Philippe’s logic, while everyone may like a peaceful, happy baby that makes no trouble, if we have a colicky crying baby that wails inconsolably hour after hour for no discernable reason, much more will our weary hearts spontaneously well up with love for that one! And we may love a child who is cheerful, affectionate, obedient, caring, and conscientious, but how much more does the heart of a father lovingly rejoice in a child who is, say, sullen, selfish, and given to violent tantrums. And the same applies to friends or spouses: we all love someone who is, say, oversensitive, selfish, unreasonable, hypocritical, habitually drunk and disloyal or unfaithful, more than someone who embodies the opposite alternatives – especially if these defective qualities mirror our own. One might have believed that God knows and loves* what is good, and knows and hates what is evil – but no, Jacques Philippe tells us; if anything, it is just the opposite! [*One might consider one of the Latin words that commonly translates ‘love’ in the Vulgate, diligere, meaning to distinguish from among others and choose (elect, eligere) in preference to the others.] So you may have imagined that God loved (and so chose) the Blessed Virgin Mary and her Immaculate (i.e., deficiency-free) Heart more than any other creature; but no, just the opposite: if only she had deficiencies, this would allow God to love her more. So think of the most deficient person you know – I always say it’s a three-way tie between Hitler, Donald Trump, and Satan – and apply Philippe’s logic: these villains with their mega-deficiencies clearly have done nothing that would merit love, but opposite-loving God therefore loves them most of all!

On the other hand, there’s God himself, speaking through the prophet Isaiah (if you buy into that whole ‘divine revelation’ thing): “Woe to you who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter!” Something to ponder. Anyway, notwithstanding the buzz in the mommy crowd, I obviously have doubts about the soundness of Philippe’s* doctrine of divine love. [*Just to be clear, I don’t mean to suggest that this bleary ‘opposite’-doctrine is original (to Philippe) or unusual. The question is, why is it so popular? Nietzsche offered one intriguing answer: ressentiment (for a brief description see my previous post here).]

Aquinas on the use of reason vs. authority

From the lapidary mind of Thomas Aquinas [my translation, and minor interpolation; for Latin original see here]:

Quodlibet 9, Qu. 4, Art. 3: 

Whether a teacher determining (or deciding) theological questions should make use more of reason, or of authority.

It seems that the teacher determining theological questions should make use of authorities rather than reasons.

 Argument: For in any science, its questions are best determined by the first principles of that science. But the first principles of theological science are the articles of faith, which are known to us through authorities. Therefore theological questions should be mainly determined through authorities.

Sed contra: But against this it is said in Titus I, 9: “that he might be able to encourage others in sound doctrine and refute those contradicting it.” But those who contradict are better refuted by reasons than by authorities. Therefore, it is more necessary to determine questions through reasons than through authorities.

I respond. It should be said that every act should be carried out as befits its end. Now a disputation can be ordered to a twofold end. For one kind of disputation is ordered toward removing doubt whether something is the case; and in such a theological disputation, those authorities should most of all be used, which are accepted by those with whom one is disputing. For example, if one disputes with Jews, it is necessary to introduce the authorities of the Old Testament; if with Manicheans, who reject the Old Testament, it is necessary to use only the texts of the New Testament; but if it be with schismatics who accept the Old and the New Testament, but not the teaching of our saints, as is the case with the Greeks, it is necessary to dispute with them using authorities from the Old or New Testament and from those doctors which they accept. If, however, they accept no authority, it is necessary, for the purpose of refuting them, to take recourse to natural reasons. [And – Thomas forgot to mention – if one is disputing with a woman, who accepts neither authorities nor reasons, and relies only on her emotions, it is necessary to discreetly withdraw from the disputation, lest she upbraid you and slap you in the face. (Relax, I’m kidding! – obviously that's not true of all women. Still, would that it were true of fewer!)]

But another kind of disputation is for the purpose of teaching in the schools, not for the purpose of removing error, but for instructing the hearers, that they may be led to an understanding of the truth towards which it points: and then it is necessary to rely on reasons which search out the root of truth, and which make one to know in what way (quomodo) what is said is true; otherwise, if the teacher were to determine the question on the basis of bare authorities, the hearer would be assured that the matter is thus, but he would acquire no knowledge or understanding and would depart empty.

And from what has been said, the response to the objection is clear.