Tuesday 28 October 2014

Follow-up letter on First Communion and Confirmation

We received a prompt reply to my initial letter to Bishop Riesbeck about First Communion and Confirmation from Fr. Geoffrey Kerslake. We weren't enormously satisfied with the substance of his response. In any case, here is my reply to his reply:


To: The Reverend Geoffrey Kerslake, Episcopal Vicar, Archdiocese of Ottawa

CC: The Most Reverend Christian Riesbeck, CC, Auxiliary Bishop of Ottawa

Dear Fr. Geoff,

Thank you for your prompt reply. I believe it helped to clarify certain issues for me. As you mentioned in your reply, “Ultimately the age is set at the discretion of the local bishop listening to the experience and advice of his advisors and parishioners.” In this light of this observation and more generally in light of Canon 212, section 3, of the Code of Canon Law regarding “the Christian faithful” (namely that “they have the right and even at times the duty to manifest to the sacred pastors their opinion on matters which pertain to the good of the Church”), I would like to take the opportunity to share some of my experience and provide some feedback about how I have seen the policy unfolding in practise.

First, I share the bishops’ hope that young people – as well as people of all ages, especially parents of young people – will be more involved and committed in their faith. However, if the faith – and specifically the sacramental theology – that we seem to be clearly taught in the CCC has the appearance of contradicting the faith which is embodied in policies/practises of the diocese, surely this is rather alienating from an integrated development of intellectual and practical faith and conducive to confusion, rather than greater involvement and commitment.

Second, I can’t help wondering: Is there is any real evidence that children who are confirmed at a later age actually do end up more involved and committed in their faith? (And if there is evidence for such a positive effect, then why not also (or instead) delay the reception of First Communion to a later age?) I am convinced that parental commitment is what principally makes a difference, and I assume that parental commitment (or non-commitment) to the Catholic faith is not (certainly not directly) a function of the age at which their children receive the various sacraments of initiation.

On the other hand, regarding the need to catechise parents, I strongly agree with you about this need. But again, the current age policy for First Communion and Confirmation seems to contradict the plain meaning of CCC 1322, and so, especially in the absence of any explanation of the point being provided from the diocese/bishops, the policy would seem to actually make it more difficult to provide clear catechesis to parents (and then to their children) on this issue. I would add that even among the most highly motivated and committed parents I know, who faithfully attend mass and try to live out the demands of the gospel with joy and generosity, there is widespread confusion regarding the nature of Confirmation – and I think this is not at all surprising given the current lack of pastoral support for developing a sound, coherent understanding of this sacrament (and again, one that coheres with the basic teaching we find in the universal Catechism).

Last year I volunteered in my parish to help with the Confirmation prep. The children were given a series of frankly rather insipid worksheets to work through at home and they attended a one-day retreat (at which I led one session). At the retreat I was very impressed with how little the children knew – i.e., how little they had learned and/or been taught - and how interested they were to learn, but I can tell you with firm moral certainty that these sixth-graders are not being well-prepared by such a process. If there is a genuine opportunity for more developed preparation at the later age, then I think we are not currently taking much advantage of this opportunity (at least not in our diocesan-approved parish prep program).

In reality, however, I think even ninth- or tenth-graders, let alone sixth-graders, based on any program, no matter how well-conceived, are very unlikely to be at a stage of maturity to take on an involvement and commitment to the Catholic faith when this is contradicted by the typical non-involvement and lack of commitment of their parents. I think it is common knowledge (and I believe this has been confirmed by actual quantitative studies) that if, as seems to be the norm, non-practising parents simply jump through whatever hoops the diocese or parish requires of them, just so their kids can be confirmed, and then carry on as before with no regular involvement in a life of faith and prayer and communal participation in the life of the parish, their kids will very likely do the same. So again, I am anxious to know if there is any substantive evidence or any sound reason for thinking that the laudable pastoral objectives you mentioned are actually being served by a blanket policy universally withholding the sacrament of Confirmation from children who otherwise, in accordance with the basic and universal doctrine and law of the Latin Rite Church, could and should be receiving it (cf. CCC 1306-1308 and Canons 889-891 (without prejudice to the authority of bishops’ conferences duly recognized in Canon 891, or to the de facto authority of local bishops which you mentioned in your reply to my initial query)).

While I understand it may be the common practice, I wonder what purpose is served by having a policy which insists rather rigidly upon one common age/grade as the norm for all children receiving the sacraments of initiation – especially when the particular age/grade that is dictated by a given policy clearly does not have any (direct) foundation in the universal doctrine and law of the Latin Rite Church. Again, I do understand the doctrinal and canonical requirements relating to having the use of reason and being appropriately instructed and disposed. But assuming that such (universal, for the Latin Rite) canonical requirements are fulfilled, what purpose is served by maintaining a rigid diocesan policy which positively excludes suitably instructed and disposed children from the grace of Confirmation for four years? Setting aside debates about what the appropriate age/grade should be for each sacrament, I understand that bishops might reasonably aim to accomplish certain pastoral and/or administrative objectives by encouraging non-practising Catholics to bring their children to receive the sacraments as a matter of course, simply based on being in a particular grade in school (that is, for Reconciliation, Confirmation, and First Communion). But regardless of the need to consider these objectives and regardless of the effectiveness of any given pastoral policy in achieving those objectives, I don’t understand the purpose of a policy of positively excluding (that is, for a period of four years) an otherwise doctrinally and canonically licit reception of some sacrament, which exclusion, in the absence of any substantive reasons in its favour, would seem to me to verge on impinging on the canonical right of the Christian faithful “to receive assistance from the sacred pastors out of the spiritual goods of the Church, especially the word of God and the sacraments” (Canon 213).

Finally, regarding the situation you mentioned of dividing families where kids went to both English and French schools: Wouldn’t an easy solution to this problem be to run the program through the parishes, not the schools? In any case, I would again wonder here: Is there any vital objective being served by insisting on a rigid, one-size-fits-all policy? It seems clear that there are not currently any kind of rigorous checks in place to ensure that candidates for confirmation are actually well-prepared and well-disposed to receive confirmation, so it seems that providing alternate avenues for prep within parishes and/or families –especially for families who are committed and involved in parish life – would both be easy to do, and such a provision would clearly not compromise any existing ‘quality-control’ measures.

 

Returning to our own immediate situation with our son, first, to be perfectly clear, our son is at the standard age of reason (or discretion): seven years old (and soon to turn eight). We are in no way inquiring about Confirmation for an infant. I mentioned the views of two of the (Latin Rite) priests of this diocese on infant Confirmation purely as an aside. I just thought it was interesting that they held this view (it rather surprised me). I did not intend to raise any concerns about the long-established practise of the Latin Church in requiring, in normal circumstances, that those receiving Confirmation and Holy Communion “have the use of reason.”

Second, I understand what you explained about the Catechism and the competence of the local ordinary to implement local policies. I also fully understand that various practical circumstances arise such that Confirmation (along with other sacraments, not to mention other spiritual or physical goods) is not always available to all people with equal facility and regularity.

The particular issue regarding which I am (still) inquiring, however, is that it remains the case, prima facie at least, that a plain contradiction arises when over a period of four years a child’s Christian initiation would seem to be both complete and incomplete, since he receives Holy Communion (which is supposed to constitute the completion of Christian initiation) without having been Confirmed (which entails that their Christian initiation is incomplete). I assume, then, that in relation to the propositions from the Catechism about Confirmation and Holy Eucharist which come into tension as a result of this local (albeit widespread) policy/practise – namely, of first having First Communion, then a delay of some years prior to Confirmation –, the proposition that Christian initiation is not complete without Confirmation (CCC 1306) is not in question. Instead, it is the doctrine that “the Holy Eucharist completes Christian initiation” (CCC 1322) that is effectively being abrogated by the current policy of our diocese (and, as you mentioned, most Canadian dioceses).

If this is correct, then from a theological perspective (as opposed to a pastoral perspective, regarding which I have already mentioned some of my concerns, or a perspective which simply invokes the authority of local bishops to make local policies) I can’t see how the usual policy of Canadian bishops constitutes a genuine implementation of this theological claim (as you put it), since an abrogation (or ignoring) seems to be quite different from an implementation. Obviously “implementation” implies a particular mode of fulfilling some general principle, not simply a setting aside, so what I am trying to understand is how this policy can be understood to constitute a fulfillment, rather than a setting aside, of the theological claim that “the Holy Eucharist completes Christian initiation.” As a means of pastoral support to parents who take seriously their duty to give their children a sound formation in the principal and most necessary elements of Christian doctrine, I would suggest that the diocese would do well to make information about this confusing subject generally available to parents (i.e., those who are charged with being the primary educators of their children). I’ll mention that the link to the “Revised policy on the sacrament of confirmation” on the diocesan chancery website is still broken.

Thank you again for your initial prompt response and your ongoing attention to our concerns.

 

Yours in Christ,

...

 

Thursday 23 October 2014

Comments on Maaike Rosendal's "A professor's case for killing"

The following are comments on part one of Maaike Rosendal's assessment of a debate in which she participated, back in April, at the University of Ottawa. It sounds like it might have been interesting. It would be interesting to hear how Matt would reply to Maaike's report of the debate and the arguments she presents. With due respect, it seems that Maaike needs to work on developing better reasoning skills and a better grasp of the issues. Here's my take (part one):

A professor’s case for killing, by Maaike Rosendal

Everything I had heard about my opponent prior to the debate at the University of Ottawa was positive and, as it turned out, also true. A young philosophy professor with an impressive curriculum vitae, Dr. Matt McLennan engaged the audience in a pleasant way and, by questioning the underlying worldview of the pro-life position as well as making a case for personhood post-sentience, provided a thought-provoking defense of abortion. But was it good enough? [Is his CV “impressive”? I think Maaike might have stated the case more precisely by saying, “I was impressed by his CV.” Whether his CV strikes you as “impressive” or not depends on who you are and what you're inclined to be impressed by (which is rather subjective). (We might wonder, for instance: Would God - as opposed to the hiring committee at St. Paul University - be "impressed" by his CV? Certainly there is room for doubt on that question.) Also, is being a "young philosophy professor" something "positive"? I'd say that lots of young (and old) philosophy professors are actually not very good or impressive people. In relation to one’s worth as a human being, “young philosophy professor” is a neutral thing, not a positive. Anyway, it sounds like Matt's a “nice” guy at least - and surely that's a good thing! (Some people seem to think that's the only thing.)]
To determine whether Dr. McLennan provided a morally and philosophically sound case for abortion, I will review his main arguments in two separate articles. We’ll take a look at his critique of the pro-life position later—in his own words, “are the secular arguments secretly religious?”—but first, let’s examine his defense of abortion on babies that aren’t sentient yet. 

In his opening statement, Dr. McLennan acknowledged that the pre-born are human beings and referred to abortion as a life-and-death issue, yet stated that opposing all abortions would be counter-intuitive and politically radical. At the same time, he was unwilling to defend all abortions because “some abortions are easier to defend than others, such as first-trimester abortions.”

The professor also explained why. “Not all abortions are alike because we’re not talking about the same human being.” How is this possible? Because in Dr. McLennan’s view, what gives a person interests is if he or she can be harmed, and this is the case once one gains sentience. [Should this be “what gives a person interests” or “what constitutes a person as such (qua person)”? Maaike is unclear on this point. Her initial claim was that Matt was making a case for personhood post-sentience. Here she indicates that his view is that a person can gain sentience, which is different from saying a being can become sentient, concomitantly also becoming a person (the latter, we should note, which is presumably Matt's actual position(?), would be a rather obviously contrived-sounding claim, badly in need of defense).] Thus, humans may come into existence at one point, which is fertilization, but it is only immoral to kill them if they have attained sentience, which is the immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness. My opponent provided his own illustration, which helps to make the implications of this view clear. If a disabled fetus has no sentience, he argued, we can allow for abortion because no harm is done. [I'm curious what's going on here: What does "disabled" have to do with it? Is this a furtive appeal to raw, naked "ableism"? Why not just, "If a fetus has no sentience..."? And why not more generally, "If a being has no sentience..."? Did Matt attempt to justify this claim? If so, how? This needs to be explained.]

Now that is the definition of functionalism, the view in which humans don’t have rights by virtue of the kind of beings they are—members of the human family—but only due to a function they can perform. [Actually no, that's not the definition of functionalism (although Maaike is of course free to use the term 'functionalism' however she wishes, provided she explains what she means).] Can’t have conscious thought? Too bad but your life doesn’t count because you don’t have certain capacities yet. Oh, and you wouldn’t know it anyway so no one really cares. [This seems inaccurate. Matt's position seems to be rather, "you have no rights because you don't have certain capacities yet. And you have no capacity for awareness, so, regardless of who "really cares," you still have no rights." ]

Sound cruel? That’s because it is. [Sound like a lame rebuttal? That's because it is.] Dr. McLennan may be well-intentioned when providing a philosophical framework that prioritizes the interests of pregnant women—as he described them, mothers who in fact are sentient beings who stand to be harmed by their pregnancies. But in reality, he allows for an entire group of other humans to be denied personhood and thus the right to life, simply because they can’t have conscious thought yet. [Yes, that's his position (I presume). But Maaike hasn't actually explained why it is cruel.]

Let’s think that through for a moment.

The reason they can’t is because they haven’t developed the capacity yet. [Right.] The reason they haven’t developed it yet is because not enough time has passed, and time is reflected in our age. [Okay.] What does that mean? In the first and for a large part the second trimester of pregnancy, the pre-born aren’t sentient simply because they aren’t old enough yet. [Not really. It's actually for the first reason: because they haven't developed enough yet.] Therefore, as I pointed out on the evening of April 4th, to deny them the right to life for that very reason is age discrimination. [Sure: "age discrimination." But so what? The question is: Is it justified? (Lots of "discrimination," including lots of "age discrimination," is justified.) And anyway: the real issue, the real question, is about the justification for “development discrimination”; the issue is simply not one of age per se.]

Case in point? During cross examination, my opponent stated that the second trimester of pregnancy, as a result of drawing the line at sentience, is a moral “grey area.” To be clear, this trimester starts at 13 and ends at 27 weeks of pregnancy. While Dr. Fellows refuses performing abortions after 23 weeks and 6 days and the audience at uOttawa noticeably cringed at abortion footage of a bloodied, second-trimester baby being wrapped in paper to be tossed out, Dr. McLennan wasn’t willing to say it would be immoral to abort pre-born children up to 27 weeks. [Okay, that’s his position, and I agree that it's cringe-worthy. But it’s not really a “case in point” of anything preceding this paragraph - or, arguably, of anything that is actually relevant to understanding the principles that are necessary for understanding the morality of abortion.]

That, my friends, is the result of a view that deems certain humans to be mere “potential people.” In fact, the professor argued that it would be better if unwanted children, whether considered as such due to their disability, gender, or other reason, aren’t “brought into reality” as they will likely suffer and be harmed. [Did Matt really say that? If he did, he’s beginning to sound like rather a presumptuous idiot.] While he genuinely cares about equality and therefore also advocates for finding solutions to the reasons for abortion, Dr. McLennan must realize that preventing these children from being born means they must be suctioned, scraped, or torn piece-by-piece out of the womb. [He advocates “finding solutions to the reasons for abortion”? Gee, how noble… but what are the “reasons for abortion”? What does that even mean?: The reason why people actually get abortions in such great numbers? Well there are lots of reasons, but the principal one is that it is legal and is condoned and endorsed by nice, caring people like Matt, the result being that when people face an unwanted pregnancy, “abortion” is often the first thing to pop into their minds and is often very tempting - so if Matt is really advocating for finding a “solution to the reasons for abortion,” what he needs is a solution to people like himself.]

I think I know what Dr. McLennan would say in response—something similar to one of his closing remarks. “These are described as wrongs experienced by the embryos but there’s no suffering or harm done to an actual person.” Remember? They will become equal human beings like you and me but aren’t yet—not as long as they don’t have conscious thought. [Since that is supposedly his basic position, I certainly hope we can remember that. We can’t very well address his view if we’re constantly forgetting what that view is. And, note to Maaike: we shouldn’t write as if we are constantly on the verge of forgetting what Matt’s view actually is.] But we have to ask ourselves why a capacity for sentience is interest-giving in the first place. [Does Maaike mean to cast doubt on whether a capacity for sentience is interest-giving? But it seems obvious that it is. The real issue is whether it is the only thing, or the first thing, that is interest-giving – and it seems obvious that it is not.] Dr. McLennan simply asserted that humans are being harmed only once they have self-consciousness. Says who?

When I asked the professor for a reason why we should draw the line there, he responded, “Well, if I am sentient, I can be harmed,” which I repeated back to make sure I had understood his view correctly. [Assuming this is an accurate report, it becomes clear here that Matt has rather poor basic reasoning skills. (Note to Professor McLennan: modus ponens and modus tollens: good; affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent: bad). The claim he needs is the rather implausible, “If I am not sentient, I cannot be harmed,” not just, "if I am sentient, I can be harmed."] Dr. McLennan hesitated. “I believe you’re going to ask me next about sleeping people and people who are in a coma.” [Was that his full response??] Although I hadn’t planned to, that would only be the logical extension of the case he had made. If it’s not immoral to kill a pre-born human because she isn’t self-aware, how could we object to killing a born human who isn’t self-aware? To put it simply, if our level of development doesn’t matter after birth, why should it beforehand? [Clearly that’s an important question, but it’s a loaded question that misrepresents Matt’s position (as previously reported by Maaike): Matt clearly enough believes that level of development does matter before birth.]

While Dr. McLennan certainly made us think, his defense of abortion and definition of what gives people rights and interests ultimately cannot account for basic human equality. [What “basic human equality”? This is clearly a problematic concept that needs to be explained and defended, not just invoked as a slogan.] Once we draw the line anywhere later than fertilization, there is nothing that grounds our views regarding rights. [Which views regarding rights? This claim is far too hasty.] Because if humans only have rights due to some acquired property rather than by virtue of being members of the human family, all we are left with is arbitrary definitions of personhood that always leave some humans out. [Obvious objection: why can’t “being members of the human family” be construed as an acquired property? In any case, the claim that the only two options are the two proposed here by Maaike is something that needs to be argued and defended, not just assumed.]

As such, it is far more reasonable to argue that, although human beings differ immensely—there may even be times that we wouldn’t know it if we’re being harmed [“there may even be…”? – no: there obviously are times when we don’t know if we’re being harmed (think of how people used to regard smoking, or think of Professor McLennan's students)]—we are nonetheless equal. [How is this not pure assertion? Why is it “far more reasonable to argue…”? What is the argument?] Thus, the only personhood definition that leaves all humans safe [this is very naively put: no definition of personhood (or of anything else) “leaves all humans safe”] is one that acknowledges our basic human rights by virtue of our membership in the human family. That doesn’t change when our capacities change but begins the very moment we come into existence. And that, for each of us, is fertilization. [Okay: that’s Maaike’s view. Unfortunately, in relation to Matt’s view, it just seems like a lot of question-begging assertion.]


Wednesday 22 October 2014

Letter to Bishop Riesbeck on First Communion and Confirmation

I sent the following letter to Bishop Riesbeck (who is also diocesan chancellor). Perhaps as a kind of voice crying out in the wilderness, I thought it might be worth sharing its contents more widely. Comments are welcome (as always).


To: The Most Reverend Christian Riesbeck, CC, Auxiliary Bishop of Ottawa
Date: October 14, 2014

Your Excellency:

Our eldest son is in Grade 2 this year and in accordance with diocesan policy we have been invited to prepare him for his first Communion (as well as first Confession). We have some concerns about this regarding which our pastor advised me to write to you.

We wish to be faithful in fulfilling our duties as Catholic parents, we wish to keep the promises we made when Isaac was baptised (especially: “You have asked to have your child baptized. In doing so you are accepting the responsibility of training him (her) in the practice of the faith”), and we wish to live in the spirit of the blessing pronounced upon us at his baptism (especially: “God is the giver of all life, human and divine. May he bless the father of this child. He and his wife will be the first teachers of their child in the ways of faith. May they be also the best of teachers, bearing witness to the faith by what they say and do, in Christ Jesus our Lord.”). In order to teach our son “the ways of faith,” we try to do so with reference to authoritative and reliable sources, so that we hand on the authentic Catholic faith.

As I understand it, the universal Catechism published in the early 1990’s is supposed to constitute a “sure norm for teaching the faith,” so I take this as a primary point of reference. In the first paragraph of the section on the Eucharist, the Catechism reads:

CCC 1322: “The holy Eucharist completes Christian initiation. Those who have been raised to the dignity of the royal priesthood by Baptism and configured more deeply to Christ by Confirmation participate with the whole community in the Lord's own sacrifice by means of the Eucharist.”

I read this as indicating that Confirmation, like Baptism, should precede reception of the holy Eucharist, since it is “the holy Eucharist” which “completes Christian initiation.” I think this is even more clear in Pope Paul VI’s 1971 Apostolic Constitution on Confirmation, Divinae consortium naturae: the ordering of the sacraments of initiation is first Baptism, second Confirmation, and lastly (the “summit”) Eucharist. (At the same time, I do recognize that it is possible to licitly receive Communion without having been Confirmed, while it is not possible to licitly or even validly receive Confirmation without having first been Baptized.) I don’t see how this claim of CCC 1322 is compatible with receiving the holy Eucharist (which is supposed to complete Christian initiation) in grade 2, and then receiving Confirmation (without which Christian initiation remains incomplete (cf. CCC 1306)) four years later in grade 6. In light of what I understand the Catechism to say, this current diocesan policy would seem to imply that for children between grades 2 and 6, their Christian initiation during this four year period is both complete (thanks to the holy Eucharist) and incomplete (since they have not been Confirmed), at the same time.

I will be grateful to be enlightened about this, but in the meantime, as a believer in the compatibility between faith and reason, this state of affairs rather unsettles me. Further, I humbly suggest that this policy inherently lends itself to generalized theological confusion regarding the specific nature of each of the sacraments and their ordering towards one another. I think there is a tendency, in light of this policy, for people (parents, children, pastors) to regard Confirmation as a second-rate sacrament, an after-thought, which we will (probably) get back to, but only after we’ve visited the summit (the Eucharist); and/or a tendency to obscure the fact that the Eucharist is the summit, and is indeed (unless I have misinterpreted CCC 1322) supposed to complete Christian initiation. Finally, most Catholics I have talked to seem to think that Confirmation is more or less equivalent to a Protestant altar call where a young person is deemed/deems himself mature enough to decide and publicly announce that he personally accepts Jesus into his heart as his Lord and Saviour (or just that he want to be a Catholic), as opposed to a Catholic sacrament, instituted by Christ to freely confer grace. I, of course, do not mean to intimate that I suppose the pastoral motivation behind the diocesan policy is to encourage this kind of attitude, but I think the policy does feed into this common misconception.

Over the past few months I have discussed this matter with three different priests of the diocese. Two of the three were markedly sympathetic to my concerns and actually mentioned that they would prefer we followed the practice of the Eastern Churches of conferring Confirmation on infants at the time of their Baptism. Each of them mentioned some of the history of the changes in diocesan policy and mentioned that there had been a letter explaining the current policy sent out some years ago, but none of them was currently prepared/inclined to give an explanation or defense of the policy on their own behalf. On the diocesan Chancery website I do find a link entitled “Revised policy on the sacrament of confirmation,” but the link is not currently functional (that is, at the time of my writing).

In Christian humility, we wish to obey the lawful pastors of the Church. At the same time, as parents, we wish to conscientiously carry out our duties as the primary educators of our children. In light of the foregoing considerations, then, we would like to request, first, an explanation of the diocesan policy on these matters, in particular in relation to the seemingly problematic, i.e., incompatible, passages from the Catechism; and, second, permission for our son to be Confirmed this year, having reached the “age of discretion” (CCC 1307) (and pending appropriate instruction and preparation) such that he “can and should receive the sacrament of Confirmation” (CCC 1306). (Please note that in making this request my understanding is that such a request might be unusual but is not unprecedented and is indeed canonically warranted - see, for example, http://www.canonlaw.info/a_preparingchildren.htm).

 

Yours in Christ,

 ...